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tional Monetary Fund restructuring policies and Ivoirian state
practices.
The Afterlife Is Where We Come From contributes to the
field of anthropological research on children at many levels,
revealing above all that children can be imagined by adults
in ways that differ markedly from Western popular, religious,
and scientific models alike. The book implicitly makes a fur-
ther, daring argument regarding the failure of mainstream
anthropology to ascribe to children and infants any cultural
knowledge or agency of their own. Provocatively, Gottlieb
goes so far as to look for the evidence of agency, enculturation,
and social action in such phenomena as the breast-feeding
habits of neonates and the naps of tiny infants. Some might
think that she is confusing the Beng model of children as
fully formed cognitive beings with her own analytical model,
but she has nonetheless fired the first volley in what will no
doubt prove to be an ongoing debate regarding from what
point we can look to children, infants, or even neonates and
foetuses as social beings and as informants on a par with
adults.
Finally, though there is no room to do so adequately here,
questions must be asked regarding Gottlieb’s practice of acting
as a medical practitioner during her periods of field research.
She does not mention having received any formal medical
training, but she nevertheless dispenses drugs and administers
treatment in a daily clinic she runs in her compound when
in the field. As she describes in a final harrowing chapter how
one of the infants she is caring for dies, the question inevitably
arises whether the child was correctly diagnosed, whether it
received the right treatment, and whether it might have sur-
vived if it had gone to the nearest hospital (25 miles away)
instead. Mixing roles like this in the field, regardless of the
unimpeachable intentions of the ethnographer, inevitably
raises methodological and ethical questions regarding the
power relations between anthropologist and informant. Got-
tlieb addresses some of these herself in the introduction to
her book, but she has opened a Pandora’s box that cannot
adequately be dealt with in the context of a book review.
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The Evolution of Thought represents a unique and important
effort to probe the many forces responsible for the nature of
great ape cognitive “intelligence.” It is the first volume to
bring together contributors working in such diverse fields as
paleontology and psychology in an attempt to describe the
cognitive and related morphological adaptations of the great
apes and their ancestors to their environments. This ambitious
effort makes a worthy contribution and is recommended for
any advanced researcher interested in the factors leading to
the emergence of specialized cognitive abilities in the great
apes.
However, this book is not easy reading and not recom-
mended for novice investigators or for those interested in
establishing what it is that makes humans (or other apes)
unique. There is little discussion of human or monkey cog-
nition. Moreover, the contributors accept that many facets of
cognition are prevalent in the great apes without a thorough
examination of the empirical evidence for such traits. Abilities
such as theory of mind, self-awareness, imitation, teaching,
and logico-mathematical abilities are granted to our ape rel-
atives without much proof that all or any great apes have
such abilities or that the abilities of great apes in these domains
differ substantially from those of their nonape primate rela-
tives or, for that matter, nonprimate species. A more thorough
and updated consideration of such comparisons would have
provided an excellent platform from which to extend spec-
ulations regarding the evolution of unique capabilities. The
editors do allude to controversies regarding the assessment of
such abilities in nonhumans but dismiss opposing views.
Given that the viewpoints expressed in this book are some-
what biased toward a possibly inflated view of great ape abil-
ities relative to those of other species, more empirical rein-
forcement for such conclusions and the inclusion of
contributions expressing opposing viewpoints would have
given the book a more well-rounded perspective.
Although theory of mind, self-awareness, meta-cognition,
counting, abstract concept formation, imitation, and teaching
are all attributed to apes and not monkeys, there are no chap-
ters focusing on the recent evidence for or against such ar-
guments. In fact, some recent studies not cited here show
that monkeys may also be capable of imitation when imitative
tasks are not confounded with motor skills (Subiaul et al.
2004), that non-symbol-trained apes and monkeys may also
represent second-order relational concepts (Fagot, Wasser-
man, and Young 2001; Vonk 2003), and that apes may not
be capable of reading mental states (Povinelli and Vonk 2004),
although others claim that even monkeys are (Flombaum and
Santos 2005). In sum, much of the information regarding the
cognitive attributes of various species is now out of date. In
addition, the lack of coverage of such topics makes it less
clear how the precipitating factors outlined as essential for
great ape cognitive development account for such abilities.
The editors implicitly endorse the prevalent viewpoint that
great apes fall on a hierarchy of intelligence with humans
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placed anthropocentrically atop the heap. Much could be
gained, however, from viewing the unique specializations of
each species as equally important and adaptive. At least one
contributor points out that each species has continued to
evolve since diverging from the last common ancestor, and
another raises the interesting question whether similar ca-
pabilities emerged in the various extant apes through different
mechanisms. More exposition of such a prospect would have
made a fascinating addition to the text.
Cognitive development is generally viewed as phylogenet-
ically following human ontological development, but com-
parisons of great ape abilities with those of human children
at various ages neglect consideration of each species’s unique
constellation of attributes and present the misguided image
of apes as undeveloped humans. Indeed, the contributors as-
sume that living great apes provide the best model for early
hominid abilities, largely ignoring that many abilities deemed
indicative of “higher levels of cognition” have now been at-
tributed to species outside the primate order such as ceta-
ceans, canines, and corvids. Whether or not one finds these
claims convincing, in-depth consideration of the merits of
relevant studies would be beneficial to any attempt to deter-
mine the origins of unique cognitive abilities of any particular
taxon. Factors suspected of being critical precipitants of the
growth and expansion of anthropoid brains are not consid-
ered with regard to species outside the primate order. If the
goal of the volume is to lay out a unique set of circumstances
that led to the exceptional development of the anthropoid
brain, then it would seem prudent to consider whether those
same factors were present in the evolution of other species
that do or do not exhibit comparable cognitive abilities.
The book focuses on the following generally accepted hy-
potheses for great ape intelligence: social intelligence, diversity
of diet, extractive foraging, and problems in locomotion. Evo-
lutionary factors include larger body size, larger brain mass,
greater EQs, longer life spans and juvenile periods, and sea-
sonality. These topics are organized into three sections: Cog-
nition in Living Great Apes, Modern Great Ape Adaptation,
and Fossil Great Ape Adaptations. The latter sections are read-
able and informative, especially for nonpaleontologists. Some
cover very little new ground but are helpful, integrative re-
views, while others offer some novel new theories and insights.
It is gratifying to see several serious and well-informed at-
tempts to evaluate the previously neglected clambering hy-
pothesis outlined by Povinelli and Cant (1995). This is the
first volume to delve deeply into analyses of the environment
and morphology of our last common ancestor and to attempt
to reconcile details from the fossil record with behavioral and
mental characteristics of our living relatives. In each section
the editors do an impressive job of weaving the pieces together
in an attempt to depict a clear picture. Unfortunately, as many
contributors point out, there are many missing pieces because
of the paucity of fossil specimens and the speculative nature
of re-creating history. In the end it remains unclear what
special pressures faced apes and not monkeys. Although the
bulk of the conclusions seem founded as much on speculation
as on hard data, leading to some conflicting theories between
contributors, there is enough detail here for the reader to
emerge with a much better appreciation of how the factors
may have interacted to support human cognitive evolution.
Indeed, the overall impression is that no one factor or
constellation of factors can account for the broad range of
cognitive feats achieved by the great apes. Furthermore,
achievements cannot be viewed as modular or generative
alone, adding to the complexity of the editors’ daunting task.
This complexity may be unavoidable when dealing with such
a nebulous topic, and the editors have avoided glossing over
such complexities for the sake of often overrated parsimony.
Unfortunately, the paucity of solid facts has prevented them
from creating as clear and coherent a picture as they set out
to do. Instead one is left somewhat overwhelmed by the myr-
iad possible explanations for a wide range of abilities that we
may not yet clearly understand. This volume is an important
step forward in our understanding of human evolution and
points to the long road ahead as we attempt to elucidate a
more coherent interpretation.
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Do Animals Think? By Clive Wynne. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004.
In Do Animals Think? the psychologist Clive Wynne sets him-
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